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In the Supreme .. Court
of the State of .Uta.h
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Reipondent,

v.

Case No. 7762 ·

ROSE DUCINNIE DAVIE,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF A-ND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as stated in the appellant's brief
is acceptable to the State. The statute under which this conviction was had is 103-51-21; Utah C~de Annotated 1943,
insofar as it is pertinent to this appeal_ and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person:

( 1) To keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or to willfully
reside in such house, or to resort th~reto for lewdness;

or,.

(2) * * *
2,
J
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES.
II. EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS,
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOMPLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY.
III. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE RECORDS OF THE TEL,E;PHONE COMPANY,
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCE
AGENT.
f

POINT I
STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MANDON·
ADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES.
The defendant was charged with the crime of keeping a
house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and
lewdness. We do not have a statutory definition of accomplices. Section 10;.-1-43, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines
who are principals. In the case of State v. Bowman, 92 Utah
540, 70 P. 2d 458, this court stated that the word "accomplice"
has been construed to refer to one who is or could be charged
as a principal with the d_efendant on trial.
Defendant acknowledges that the witnesses could not
be charged with the crime of keeping a house of prostitution,
but asserts, apparently, that defendant and the witnesses could
4·
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have been charged under that part of the statute making it an
offense to Hresort thereto for lewdness." Defendant, however,
\vas not charged with resorting, and even if the witne~ses could
have been charged under the separate offense of resorting
"thereto for lewdness" that would not make them accomplices
in this case.

Cal~fornia has a statute defining principals which is .substantially similar to ours.

-

Section 11.11 of the Penal Code of California which
requires that testimony of an accomplice be corroborated before
a conviction can be had was amended in 1915 to define an
accomplice as follows:
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony
of the accomplice is given.
This amendment came about as a result of the decision -of
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.)
704, \vhich is cited by defendant. Since the time of the amendment the courts of California have given a much stricter and
restrictive definition of an accomplice. !he case of People v.
Clapp, 151 P.-2d 237 (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 753, is an illustration.
This was a case where the defendant had performed an abortion upon one of the witnesses, and two other witnesses had
watched the operation. It was aserted ·on appeal that the two
witnesses who were present. during the operation. were accomplices, and, therefore, their testimony needed to be corroborated as required by Section 11.11 of the Penal Code.
The court stated:

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

***

It is necessaty ·to determine whether sections
_31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other· provisions of
. the criminal _law subject the witness to prosecution
under the provisions that the defendant is~ accused of
violating, or whether the acts of the ·witness participating in the transac;tion. constitute a separate and distinct offense. If a statutory provision so- defines -~ crime
that the participation of two or more· persons is necessary .Jor its commission, ·but prescribes punishment
for the acts of certain participants only, and another
statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts
of participants. not subject td the first. provision, it is
clear that the .latter are criminally liable only under
the specific provision relating to their participation in
·the criminal transaction. The specific provision making
the acts of participation in the transaction. a separate
offense supercedes the general provision in section 31
of the Penal Code that such acts subject the participant
in. t~e crime of the accused to prosecution for its commtsston.
The reasoning of this case was e~te~ded in the case o£ People
v. Grayson, 189 P. 2d 285_, 8 Cal. App. 2d 516 (1948). The
appellant _ was .convicted of receiving and holding a- wager on
a- h?rse race. On appeal he complained -that a witness, one
. Pease, who placed a. bet with the defendant, was an accomplice. In this. case there were not tw_o separate statutes covering the offenses, but section 37a of the Penal Code of Californi~ had several _subdivisions. Subdivision 3 made it illeg~l
for a person to receive bets.· Subdivision 6 of· the section made
. it illegal for a person to offer o~ pl~ce a bet. The court reasoned:

* * * So, here·,

since the act of placing a bet, without which, of cpurse, the bet could not be received by
another, . was punishable as a separate offense under
subdivision 6, and was not specifically under sub6
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division 3, it was not punishable under section 31,
and Pease was not an accomplice of appellant who received the bet. The testimony of Pease was sufficient,
without corroboration, to prove the offense charged in
count one.
The de~end~nt in the present ca~e is ch~rged with keeping a house of ill fame. Section 103-51-21, Ptah Code Annotated 1943, has several subdivisions. Within subdivision 1
there are· several clauses, to-wit:
It shall be unlawful for any person:
( 1) To keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or to willfully reside in such house, or to resort thereto for lewdness;
It is the contention of the State that each of these clauses is
a separate and distinct offense just as though they were set
out in separate subdivisions or separate sections_. Consequently,
if the above-mentioned witnesses were guilty of a crime it
was a separate and distinct offense--that of resorting to a house
of ill fame for lewdness.
It has been held in Iowa that a woman engaged in prostitution in a house of ill fame is not an ~ccomplice of the
person charged with the management of .the house. This W~S
based upon the theory that there was no affirmative participation in the acmal management. T~e Iowa statute defining
principal is similar to ours. In State v. Anderson, 38 NW 662,
the d~fendant was. convicted .of keeping a house of ill "fame.
Four women who stayed in the house testified to numerous
acts of prostitution in the place and under the supervision of
the defendant who received ·part of the remuneration· paid to
the women by the men patron~zing the house. rwo of these
7
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\VOmen did not assist ln .its . management.

The other two

did such work as night cl~rking, serving drinks and hustling.
The
lower court . failed
to instruct that the. two· who did . not
.
. .
have any control of the managemen_t of the house w~re accom·_plices. The court did. in~truct that the other two were accomplices and that the statute of Iowa required corroboration. The
'

.

'

:

.

'

.

~

.

appellate court sai~;

* * * Two of these \Vitnesses were intimates of
the· place but did not assist in its management, therefore they were not to be deemed accomplices. However, there is evidence from which the jury could find
t\vo other witnesses were accomplices. (Page 665).
tc

See also People v. Webb; 25 N.Y.S. 2d· 554; reversed on
other grounds, 26 N.Y.S. 2d ~·86; People v. Swift, 261 App.
Div. 808, 23 N.Y.S. ·1022; Jackson v. United States, D. C.
App. ( 1919), 48 App. D. C. 269; S~ate v. Chauvet 1900, 111
Iowa.687, 83 N.W. 717, 51 L.R.A. 630, 82 Am. St. Rep. 359;
Stone v. State ( 1919), 47 Tex. C. Cr. 575, 85 S.W. 808;
People v. _Richard~on ( 1917), 22 N.Y. 103, 118 N.E. 514;
16 C.J. 1388, page 681. It should be noted that New York,
Io\va and California have statutes which are substantially
si1nilar to the State of Utah's defining principal and requiring
corroboration of accomplices' testin1ony. .
It is not contended that these four witnesses in the present
case had any acti:ve management in the keeping of the house
of ill fame which the defendant is accused of operating. It
is, therefore, submitted that they were not accomplices any
more th~n was the prostitute in ·the Iowa case.
8
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POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS,
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOMPLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY.
This court in the case of State v. Simpson, 236 P. 2d
1077, decided October 26, 1951, squar~ly met the question of whether the refusal of a trial judge to instruct the
jury regarding the testimony of accomplices and the need
for corroboration thereof was in error.
As to the third point, while it is perhaps a better
practice for the trial court to give a cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of an accomplice, it is
generally held that this is a matter which lies within
the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not reversible
·error to fail to give such an instruction. People v. Ruiz,
144 Cal. 251, 77 P. 907; Commonwealth v. Beal, 314
Mass. 210, 50 N.E. 2d 14; State v. Gaddis, 131 N.J.L.
44, 34 A.2d 735; Gordon v. State, 188 Miss. 708, 196
So. 507; U. S. v. Block, 2 Cir., 88 P.2d 618; and People
v. Nathanson, 389 Ill. 311, 59 N.E. 2d 677. p. 1083.
The instructions usually given in criminal cases as to
the weight of testimony and the credibility of witnesses was
given in this case. Instruction No. 13 is particularly in point.
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact, of
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses. In weighing the testimony you may consider the bias, if any is shown, of any witness to testify for or against any party, his interest, if any, in the
result of the trial, his appearance on the witness stand,

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and ·any probable motive which he may have to tell
that. vvhich is not true; you may ~on~ider the reason:. ableness of the witnesses'· statements, their apparent
· frankness and candor, or the want of it, their oppor~
tunity to· know and understand, and their capacity to
remember, and from all the facts and ·-circumstances
. given in evidence determine what w~ight ought to be
given to ~e testimony of any witness..
.There was ample corroborative evidence coming from
police officers Garside (R. 32-61) (R. 133, 136), Bennett
·(R. 104~136), Wilson (R. 127), and Henderson (R. 106),
and the other witnesses .

. POINT III
TI-IE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE RECORDS OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCE
AGENT.
The record of the telephone company was 'identified by
the unit manager of the. Ogden office. He identified them as
records of the company which showed telephone listings of
the users of the service of the company. He stated that they
\Vere from nis office, and that he had access to them (R. 82).
As to the power company's records the person identifying
those records stated he was an employee of the power company,· that he took the records from the files of the power
company of which he had charge, and ·that it was his duty to
keep records of the -~sers. of the .power company' s·· service (R.
103-104).
10
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This state has recognized the Hshop book" rule in several
cases, a list of which is given in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co .. , 96 U. 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 822. In the case of Bohlke
v. Wright, 93 P. 2d 321, 200Wash. :~74 (1939), it was urged
that it was error to allow the admission of the record of a telephone conversation. The divisional manager of- the telephone
company was allowed to identify the record.
The slip of paper was part of the records .of the
telephone company, and as such was entitled to be
admitted in evidence. Cit~tions omitted.) p. 32~·.
See also Pinkerton's National Detective Agency v. Rosedale
Silk Co., 184 Atl. 282, 121 Pa. Supra 496.
The records of the insurance company were identified by
Mr. Harold Tribe, who shared business office space with the
insurance agent, William J. Holmes, who at the time of the
trial, was out of the state. He testified that they shared offices,
that they had had occasion to assist each other in various ways
and were familiar with the records in each other's business.
He identified an insurance diary which was kept in the files
at Hour office." On cross examination he testified that he had
an occasion to take ~nd replace the record in the insurance
company's files, and that -the record came from the file in
their office (R. 99-102).
The necessity of verifying the correctness of entries by the b9okkeeper, clerk or other pe~son who made the
entries in a book of accounts is obviated or necessarily
relaxed when such per~on has died, has become and
remains at the time of the trial, insane or physically
unable to attend as a witness, is beyond the jurisdiction
11
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of the court or otherwise unavailable as a witness.
**
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1070.

*.

It is submitted that Mr. 'Tribe had ample opportunity to be
familiar with d1e records of the insurance company inasmuch
as he had a joint office \vith this insurance .company and had
assisted the agent thereof in various ways.

CONCLUSION
lt is respectfully submitted that the lower court did not
err in refusing to instruct on accomplices' testimony or in
admitting into the evidence the records heretofore referred to.
Respectfully,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General

J.

RICHARD BELL,
Assistant Attorney General

12
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